

# International Journal of Game Theory

A Publication of the Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna

## Editorial Board

- Robert J. Aumann, Hebrew University of Jerusalem  
Claude Berge, University of Paris  
Karl H. Borch, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration  
John C. Harsanyi, University of California, Berkeley  
William F. Lucas, Cornell University  
Michael Maschler, Hebrew University of Jerusalem  
Oskar Morgenstern, New York University  
Anatol Rapoport, University of Toronto  
Robert Reichardt, University of Vienna  
Reinhard Selten, University of Bielefeld  
Lloyd S. Shapley, RAND Corporation  
Martin Shubik, Yale University  
Patrick Suppes, Stanford University  
Mitsuo Suzuki, Tokyo Institute of Technology  
Robert M. Thrall, Rice University  
N. N. Vorob'ev, Academy of Sciences, Leningrad

## Managing Editor

Gerhard Schwödiauer, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna

Volume 4

1975



Physica-Verlag · Vienna

# International Journal of Game Theory

A International Journal of Game Theory

Volume 4, 1975

Editor: J. H. van den Hoven, University of Amsterdam

Editor: J. H. van den Hoven, University of Amsterdam

Editor: J. H. van den Hoven, University of Amsterdam

Editor: J. H. van den Hoven, University of Amsterdam

Editor: J. H. van den Hoven, University of Amsterdam

Editor: J. H. van den Hoven, University of Amsterdam

Editor: J. H. van den Hoven, University of Amsterdam

Editor: J. H. van den Hoven, University of Amsterdam

Editor: J. H. van den Hoven, University of Amsterdam

Editor: J. H. van den Hoven, University of Amsterdam

Editor: J. H. van den Hoven, University of Amsterdam

Editor: J. H. van den Hoven, University of Amsterdam

Editor: J. H. van den Hoven, University of Amsterdam

Editor: J. H. van den Hoven, University of Amsterdam

Editor: J. H. van den Hoven, University of Amsterdam

Editor: J. H. van den Hoven, University of Amsterdam

Editor: J. H. van den Hoven, University of Amsterdam

Editor: J. H. van den Hoven, University of Amsterdam

Composed and printed by: „Journalfranz“ Arnulf Liebing, Würzburg

©

PHYSICA-VERLAG Rudolf Liebing KG • Seilerstätte 18, A-1010 Wien

1975

## CONTENTS

### Papers

<i>Buckley, J.J., and T.E. Westen: The Majority Rule Game</i> . . . . .	105
<i>Champsaur, P.: How to Share the Cost of a Public Good</i> . . . . .	113
<i>Dubey, E.: On the Uniqueness of the Shapley Value</i> . . . . .	131
<i>Harsanyi, J.C.: The Tracing Procedure: A Bayesian Approach to Defining a Solution for</i> <i>n-Person Noncooperative Games</i> . . . . .	61
<i>Kalai, E.: On Game-Type Subsets</i> . . . . .	141
<i>—, M. Maschler, and G. Owen: Asymptotic Stability and other Properties of Trajectories and</i> <i>Transfer Sequences Leading to the Bargaining Sets</i> . . . . .	193
<i>Kaneko, M.: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Existence of a Nonempty Core of a</i> <i>Majority Game</i> . . . . .	215
<i>Kilgour, D.M.: The Sequential Truel</i> . . . . .	151
<i>Kohlberg, E.: Optimal Strategies in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information</i> . . . . .	7
<i>—: The Information Revealed in Infinitely-Repeated Games of Incomplete Information</i> . . . . .	57
<i>Nakamura, K.: The Core of a Simple Game with Ordinal Preferences</i> . . . . .	95
<i>Owen, G.: A Note on the Convergence of Transfer Sequences in n-Person Games</i> . . . . .	212
<i>Ponssard, J.-P.: A Note on the L-P Formulation of Zero-Sum Sequential Games with Incom-</i> <i>plete Information</i> . . . . .	1
<i>Shapley, L.S., and M. Shubik: Competitive Outcomes in the Cores of Market Games</i> . . . . .	229
<i>Selten, R.: Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive</i> <i>Games</i> . . . . .	25
<i>Zeleny, M.: Games with Multiple Payoffs</i> . . . . .	179

### Listing Service

<i>Abraham, N., and T. Yair: The Existence of Non-Diagonal Axiomatic Values</i> . . . . .	240
<i>Anbar, D., and E. Kalai: A One-Shot Bargaining Problem</i> . . . . .	241
<i>Asscher, N.: Bargaining Sets for 3-Person Games without Side Payments</i> . . . . .	239
<i>—: An Cardinal Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games without Side Payments</i> . . . . .	240
<i>Aumann, R.J.: An Elementary Proof that Integration Preserves Uppersemicontinuity</i> . . . . .	241
<i>Harsanyi, J.C.: An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alterna-</i> <i>tive Definition</i> . . . . .	175
<i>Hart, S.: Values of Non-Differentiable Markets with a Continuum of Traders</i> . . . . .	242
<i>—, and E. Kohlberg: Equally Distributed Correspondences</i> . . . . .	242
<i>Kalai, E.: Nonsymmetric Nash Solutions and Replications of 2-Person Bargaining</i> . . . . .	243
<i>Krom, M.-R.: Infinite Games and Special Baire Space Extensions</i> . . . . .	239
<i>Maschler, M.: An Advantage of the Bargaining Set over the Core</i> . . . . .	240
<i>Mertens, J.F., and S. Zamir: The Maximal Variation of a Bounded Martingale</i> . . . . .	243
<i>Shapley, L.S.: An Example of a Slow-Converging Core</i> . . . . .	176
<i>—: Noncooperative General Exchange</i> . . . . .	176
<i>—: Cardinal Utility from Intensity Comparisons</i> . . . . .	239
<i>—, and M. Shubik: Competitive Outcomes in the Cores of Market Games</i> . . . . .	244
<i>Yu, P.L., and M. Zeleny: The Set of All Nondominated Solutions in Linear Cases and a</i> <i>Multicriteria Simplex Method</i> . . . . .	244

